The world appears to conscious creatures in terms of experienced sensory qualities, but science doesn't find sensory experience in that world, only physical objects and properties. I argue that the failure to locate consciousness in the world is a function of our necessarily representational relation to reality as knowers: we won't discover the terms in which reality is represented by us in the world as it appears in those terms. Qualia -- arguably a type of representational content -- will therefore (...) not be found in the physical world as characterized in experience or science. Instead, consciousness constitutes a subjective, representational reality for cognitive systems such as ourselves, and the physical world is a represented objective reality. I suggest that naturalistic approaches to explaining consciousness should acknowledge the non-objectivity of experience, and be constrained by evidence that consciousness accompanies certain sorts of behaviour-controlling representational functions carried out by complex, physically instantiated mind-systems. I evaluate a variety of current hypotheses about consciousness, and suggest that a mature science of representation may help explain why, perhaps as matter of representational necessity, experience arises as a natural but not objectively discoverable phenomenon. (shrink)

Awareness is a personal experience, which is only accessible to the rest of world through interpretation. We set out to identify a neural correlate of visual awareness, using brief subliminal and supraliminal verbal stimuli while measuring cerebral blood flow distribution with H215O PET. Awareness of visual verbal stimuli differentially activated medial parietal association cortex (precuneus), which is a polymodal sensory cortex, and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, which is thought to be primarily executive. Our results suggest participation of these higher order perceptual (...) and executive cortical structures in visual verbal awareness. (shrink)

T W Moore; Punishment and Education, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 1, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 29–34, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9752.1967.t.

A new edition of the Homeric Hymns is in preparation by Mr. W. R. Halliday, Principal of King's College, London, and myself. In the meantime there are some passages in the Hymn to Hermes which call for longer treatment than would be natural in an edition. Some of these notes are suggested by the substantial and valuable edition of Professor L. Radermacher.

This paper is an attempt to elucidate the senses in which this place-name is used in Homer; to assign meanings to the Homeric terms Achaean, Iason and Pelasgic Arge, to ‘Argive’ as a synonym for Greek, and to establish the nature of the Argos over which Agamemnon ruled. I take the Homeric poems as the unity which they profess to be, and which they must be for historical enquiry. Whatever liberties Homer took with his materials it is plain he was (...) careful to respect events. The effort to distinguish between old and new in the Iliad and Odyssey has caused needless and fruitless encumbrance to the official historians, such as Busolt; the Unitarian position has given us the remarkable results of Professor Myres' . The consistency of Mr. Myres' account, and I venture to hope of mine, allows a fresh inference back to the homogeneity of the poems which are their source. (shrink)

Enough and too much has been written about the Epic Cycle. Upon scanty quotations and a jejune epitome a tedious literature has been built. The older writers, such as Welcker, tried to ‘reconstruct’—as profitable and satisfying a task as inferring a burnt manor-house from its cellars; later scholars have gone out in tracing the tradition of the poems through the learned age of Greece—a scaffolding without ties, by which this or that conclusion is reached according to temperamental disposition to this (...) or that fallacy. I do not intend to enter more than is needful into a controversy where so far as I can see everyone has gone beyond the evidence. If I add to the bulk of the literature, it is in the hope of putting things in their proper places and of presenting the data as they appear to a future editor. (shrink)

It is usual, since Wolf, to print πέλει in 396 instead of ποτί. The authority for this is very slight: E. M. 214. 33 from Diogenes βρόμος κυρίως το πυρς. ᾒχος. πεποιημένη δέ στιν ων κατ μμησιν το ποτελουµνου ψόφου ν πυρ, οον τσος γε πέλει βρόμος αθοµνοιο. schol. Ap. Rhod. III. 861 the etymology of Bx03B1;θριµώ … ἢ παρ το βρµον το πυρός. τσσος γρ πλεται βρµος γρ θες λαµπαδοΧος. It is not certain that either of these quotations refer (...) to our line; in the former, as will be noticed, πυρς is out of place, and we cannot tell how the second would have continued. In any case, it is not obvious what turned such an easy word as πλει into the difficult ποτ. (shrink)

Testimony, even in the well-worked parts of antiquity, continues to accrue, some from new papyri, some from texts long known but overlooked. In the result the critic is discomfited, honest men come by their own. οιόνδ' πέβη τόδε πργμα. This document, which consists of two lives of Homer and the Agon inserted between them, has long been derived from the Μουσεîον of Alcidamas. The conjecture was contested and the survival of Alcidamas denied. The publication of twenty-five lines from a papyrus (...) of s. II.–III. p. C. by Professor J. G. Winter , containing a Homeric biography signed αλκι] δαμαντος περι ομηρου put an end to the matter. See on the whole question Mr. Winter's remarks and a paper by Sig. Carlo Gallavotti of Bologna, Rivista di Filologia, 1929, 31. (shrink)

An aspect of Pisistratus, which has not hitherto been utilized in this question , appears to justify another presentment of the evidence which connects him with the Homeric tradition. I shall endeavour to be brief and not to repeat what is common property or irrelevant. The literature and the bearing of the controversy are given with his usual clearness by P. Cauer, Grundfragen der Homerkritik,2 pp. 125 sqq. Cauer's private doctrine, that Homer was for the first time written down by (...) Pisistratus, I consider sufficiently refuted by C. Rothe, Die Was als Dichtung, pp. 5–13. Fantastic views lately promulgated in England are1 dealt with conclusively to my mind by Mr. A. Lang, The World of Homer, pp. 281 sqq., to whose account nothing for controversial purposes need be added. On looking back over the literature I find myself most in agreement with Hans Flach, whose treatise, Die litterarische Thdtigkeit des Peisistratos, 1885, has been unduly depreciated. I shall have to repeat my own views expressed in the Classical Review, 1901, p. 7; 1907, p. 18; and in the Classical Quarterly, 1909, p. 84. (shrink)

The view of Homer which I have attempted to expound in articles recently contributed to this and other journals may be stated as follows: an individual, father of the children, first natural then spiritual, who bore his name and worshipped him, lived in Chios, of which island he was so much the glory that ‘ Chian ’ in the mouth of Simonides, himself a professional and an islander, means ‘ Homer.’ He was not blind, like his disciple the Chian Cynaethus, (...) but seeing: he selected, arranged, adorned and expanded two episodes in the stock of saga which the colonists brought with them from Europe. (shrink)

I will next briefly enumerate the evidence for the separate poems, beginning with the Trojan series.

This book comes strongly to the defence of educational theory and shows that it has a structure and integrity of its own. The author argues that the validity of educational theory may best be judged in terms of the various assumptions made in it. His argument is illustrated by a review and critique of some particularly influential theories of education: those of Plato, Rousseau, James Mill and John Dewey. He stresses the need for an on-going, contemporary, general theory of education (...) and examines the ways in which the disciplines of psychology, sociology and philosophy can contribute to a general theory of this kind. (shrink)